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1 Introduction
Approximate Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are the central solution con-
cept in game theory. Since it is known that computing an exact Nash equilib-
rium [11,6] is unlikely to be achievable in polynomial time, a line of work has
arisen that studies the computational aspects of approximate Nash equilibria.
The most widely studied notion is of an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-
Nash), which requires that all players have an expected payo that is within 
of a best response. This is an additive notion of approximate equilibrium; the
problem of computing approximate equilibria of bimatrix games using a rel-
ative notion of approximation is known to be PPAD-hard even for constant
approximations [10].
So far, -Nash equilibria have mainly been studied in the context of two-
player bimatrix games. A line of work [13,12,3] has investigated the best 
that can be guaranteed in polynomial time for bimatrix games. The current
best result, due to Tsaknakis and Spirakis [28], is a polynomial-time algorithm
that nds a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game with all payos in
[0; 1].
In this paper, we study -Nash equilibria in the context of many-player
games, a topic that has received much less attention. A simple approximation
algorithm for many-player games can be obtained by generalising the algorithm
of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [13] from the two-player setting to
the n-player setting, which provides a guarantee of  = 1   1n . This has since
been improved independently by three sets of authors [4,22,3]. They provide a
method that converts a polynomial-time algorithm for nding -Nash equilibria
in (n 1)-player games into an algorithm that nds a 12  -Nash equilibrium in
n-player games. Using the polynomial-time 0:3393 algorithm of Tsaknakis and
Spirakis [28] for 2-player games as the base case for this recursion, this allows
us to provide polynomial-time algorithms with approximation guarantees of
0:6022 in 3-player games, and 0:7153 in 4-player games. These guarantees tend
to 1 as n increases, and so far, no constant  < 1 is known such that, for all n,
an -Nash equilibrium of an n-player game can be computed in polynomial
time.
For n-player games, we have lower bounds for -Nash equilibria. More pre-
cisely, Rubinstein has shown that when n is not a constant there exists a
constant but very small  such that it is PPAD-hard to compute an -Nash
equilibrium [27]. This is quite dierent from the bimatrix game setting, where
the existence of a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme rules out such
a lower bound, unless all of PPAD can be solved in quasi-polynomial time [26].
can be solved in quasi-polynomial time [26].
Polymatrix games. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of many-
player games called polymatrix games. In a polymatrix game, the interaction
between the players is specied by an n vertex graph, where each vertex repre-
sents one of the players. Each edge of the graph species a bimatrix game that
will be played by the two respective players, and thus a player with degree d
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will plays d bimatrix games simultaneously. More precisely, each player picks
a strategy, and then plays this strategy in all of the bimatrix games that he is
involved in. His payo is then the sum of the payos that he obtains in each
of the games.
Polymatrix games are a class of succinctly represented n-player games: a
polymatrix game is specied by at most n2 bimatrix games, each of which can
be written down in quadratic space with respect to the number of strategies.
This is unlike general n-player strategic form games, which require a represen-
tation that is exponential in the number of players.
The problem of computing exact Nash equilibria in polymatrix games can
be tackled in exponential time by Lemke's algorithm [24]. For the special
subclass of generalized zero sum games on networks it was proved by Cai and
Daskalakis [5] that this problem can be solved in polynomial time. On the
other hand, there has been relatively little work on approximation algorithms
for polymatrix games. The approximation algorithms for general games can
be applied in this setting in an obvious way, but to the best of our knowledge
there have been no upper bounds that are specic to polymatrix games. On
the other hand, the lower bound of Rubinstein mentioned above is actually
proved by constructing polymatrix games. Thus, there is a constant but very
small  such that it is PPAD-hard to compute an -Nash equilibrium [27], and
this again indicates that approximating equilibria in polymatrix games is quite
dierent to approximating equilibria in bimatrix games.
Our contribution. Our main result is an algorithm that, for every  in the
range 0 <   0:5, nds a (0:5 + )-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game
in time polynomial in the input size and 1 . Note that our approximation
guarantee does not depend on the number of players, which is a property that
was not previously known to be achievable for polymatrix games, and still
cannot be achieved for general strategic form games.
We prove this result by adapting the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spi-
rakis [28] (henceforth referred to as the TS algorithm). They give a gradient
descent algorithm for nding a 0:3393-Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game.
We generalise their gradient descent techniques to the polymatrix setting, and
show that it always arrives at a (0:5+ )-Nash equilibrium after a polynomial
number of iterations.
In order to generalise the TS algorithm, we had to overcome several issues.
Firstly, the TS algorithm makes the regrets of the two players equal in every
iteration, but there is no obvious way to achieve this in the polymatrix setting.
Instead, we show how gradient descent can be applied to a strategy prole
where the regrets are not necessarily equal. Secondly, the output of the TS
algorithm is either a point found by gradient descent, or a point obtained by
modifying the result of gradient descent. In the polymatrix game setting, it is
not immediately obvious how such a modication can be derived with a non-
constant number of players (without an exponential blowup). Thus we apply a
dierent analysis, which proves that the point resulting from gradient descent
always has our approximation guarantee. It is an interesting open question
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whether a better approximation guarantee can be achieved when there is a
constant number of players.
An interesting feature of our algorithm is that it can be applied even when
players have diering degrees. Originally, polymatrix games were dened only
for complete graphs [24]. Since previous work has only considered lower bounds
for polymatrix games, it has been sucient to restrict attention to regular
graphs, as in work Rubinstein [27]. However, since this paper is proving an
upper bound, we must be more careful. As it turns out, our algorithm will
eciently nd a (0:5 + )-Nash equilibrium for all  > 0, no matter what
graph structure the polymatrix game has.
Finally, we show that our algorithm can be applied to two-player Bayesian
games. In a two-player Bayesian game, each player is assigned a type according
to a publicly known probability distribution. Each player knows their own type,
but does not know the type of their opponent. Rosenthal and Howson showed
that the problem of nding an exact equilibrium in a two-player Bayesian game
is equivalent to nding an exact equilibrium in a polymatrix game [23]. We
show that this correspondence also holds for approximate equilibria: nding
an -Nash equilibrium in these games can be reduced to the problem of nding
an -Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game, and therefore, our algorithm can
be used to eciently nd a (0:5+)-Nash equilibrium of a two-player Bayesian
game.
Related work. An FPTAS for the problem of computing an -Nash equilib-
rium of a bimatrix game does not exist unless every problem in PPAD can be
solved in polynomial time [6]. Arguably, the biggest open question in equilib-
rium computation is whether there exists a PTAS for this problem. As we have
mentioned, for any constant  > 0, there does exist a quasi-polynomial -time
algorithm for computing an -Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, or any
game with a constant number of players [26,2], with running time kO(log k) for
a kk bimatrix game. Consequently, in contrast to the many-player case, it is
not believed that there exists a constant  such that the problem of comput-
ing an -Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game (or any game with a constant
number of players) is PPAD-hard, since it seems unlikely that all problems in
PPAD have quasi-polynomial-time algorithms. On the other hand, for multi-
player games, as mentioned above, there is a small constant  such that it is
PPAD-hard to compute an -Nash equilibrium of an n-player game when n is
not constant. One positive result we do have for multi-player games is that
there is a PTAS for anonymous games (where the identity of players does not
matter) when the number of strategies is constant [14].
Polymatrix games have played a central role in the reductions that have
been used to show PPAD-hardness of games and other equilibrium problems [11,
6,16,19,7]. Computing an exact Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game is
PPAD-hard even when all the bimatrix games played are either zero-sum games
or coordination games [5]. Polymatrix games have been used in other contexts
too. For example, Govindan and Wilson proposed a (non-polynomial-time) al-
gorithm for computing Nash equilibria of an n-player game, by approximating
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the game with a sequence of polymatrix games [20]. Later, they presented a
(non-polynomial) reduction that reduces n-player games to polymatrix games
while preserving approximate Nash equilibria [21]. Their reduction introduces
a central coordinator player, who interacts bilaterally with every player.
For Bayesian two player games, Conitzer and Sandholm [8] proved that de-
termining whether a given two-player game has a pure Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium (BNE) is NP-complete. Austrin, Braverman and Chlamtac [1] extended
this hardness result to approximate pure BNE. More specically, they proved
that given that a Bayesian game admits a pure BNE it is NP-hard to com-
pute a pure -BNE for  = 0:004. Moreover, for the special case where the
distribution over the types of the players is uniform they provided a quasi
polynomial algorithm for computing an  pure BNE, for any  > 0. Finally,
Rubinstein [27] proved that there is a (very small) constant  such that it is
PPAD-hard to compute any -BNE of a Bayesian two player game. Our main
result is the rst non-trivial upper bound on the approximation guarantee for
this problem that can be achieved in polynomial time.
2 Preliminaries
We start by xing some notation. We use [k] to denote the set of integers
f1; 2; : : : ; kg, and when a universe [k] is clear, we will use S = fi 2 [k]; i =2 Sg
to denote the complement of S  [k]. For a k-dimensional vector x, we use
x S to denote the elements of x with indices S, and in the case where S = fig
has only one element, we simply write x i for x S .
Polymatrix games. An n-player polymatrix game is dened by an undi-
rected graph (V;E) with n vertices, where every vertex corresponds to a player.
The edges of the graph specify which players interact with each other. For each
i 2 [n], we use N(i) = fj : (i; j) 2 Eg to denote the neighbors of player i.
Each edge (i; j) 2 E species that a bimatrix game will be played between
players i and j. Each player i 2 [n] has a xed number of pure strategies
mi, and the bimatrix game on edge (i; j) 2 E will therefore be specied by an
mimj matrix Aij , which gives the payos for player i, and anmjmi matrix
Aji, which gives the payos for player j. We allow the individual payos in
each matrix to be an arbitrary (even negative) rational number. As we describe
in the next subsection, we will rescale these payos so that the overall payo
to each player lies in the range [0; 1].
2.1 Payo Normalisation
Before we continue, we must rst discuss how the payos in the game are
rescaled. It is common, when proving results about additive notions of ap-
proximate equilibria, to rescale the payos of the game. This is necessary in
order for dierent results to be comparable. For example, all results about addi-
tive approximate equilibria in bimatrix games assume that the payo matrices
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have entries in the range [0; 1], and therefore an -Nash equilibrium always has
a consistent meaning. For the same reason, we must rescale the payos in a
polymatrix in order to give a consistent meaning to an -approximation.
An initial, naive, approach would be to specify that each of the individual
bimatrix games has entries in the range [0; 1]. This would be sucient if we
were only interested in polymatrix games played on either complete graphs or
regular graphs. However, in this model, if the players have diering degrees,
then they also have diering maximum payos. This means that an additive
approximate equilibrium must pay more attention to high degree players, as
they can have larger regrets.
One solution to this problem, which was adopted in the conference version
of this paper [15], is to rescale according to the degree. That is, given a polyma-
trix game where each bimatrix game has payos in the range [0; 1], if a player
has degree d, then each of his payo matrices is divided by d. This transfor-
mation ensures that every player has regret in the range [0; 1], and therefore
low degree players are not treated unfairly by additive approximations.
However, rescaling according to the degree assumes that each bimatrix
game actually uses the full range of payos in[0; 1]. In particular, some bimatrix
games may have minimum payo strictly greater than 0, or maximum payo
strictly less than 1. This issue arises, in particular, in our application of two-
player Bayesian games. Note that, unlike the case of a single bimatrix game, we
cannot x this by rescaling individual bimatrix games in a polymatrix game,
because we must preserve the relationship between the payos in all of the
bimatrix games that a player is involved in.
To address this, we will rescale the games so that, for each player, the
minimum possible payo is 0, and the maximum possible payo is 1. For each
player i, we denote by Ui the maximum payo he can obtain, and by Li the
minimum payo he can obtain. Formally:
Ui := max
p2[mi]
0@ X
j2N(i)
max
q2[mj ]
 
Aij(p; q)
1A ;
Li := min
p2[mi]
0@ X
j2N(i)
min
q2[mj ]
 
Aij(p; q)
1A :
Then, for all i and all j 2 N(i) we will apply the following transformation,
which we call T (), to all the entries z of payo matrices Aij :
Ti(z) =
1
Ui   Li 

z   Li
d(i)

:
Observe that, since player i's payo is the sum of d(i) many bimatrix games, it
must be the case that after transforming the payo matrices in this way, player
i's maximum possible payo is 1, and player i's minimum possible payo is 0.
For the rest of this paper, we will assume that the payo matrices given by
Aij are rescaled in this way.
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2.2 Approximate Nash Equilibria
Strategies. A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over
player i's pure strategies. Formally, for each positive integer k, we denote the
(k   1)-dimensional simplex by k := fx : x 2 Rk; x  0;
Pk
i=1 xi = 1g, and
therefore the set of strategies for player i is mi . For each mixed strategy
x 2 m, the support of x is dened as supp(x) := fi 2 [m] : xi 6= 0g, which is
the set of strategies played with positive probability by x.
A strategy prole species a mixed strategy for every player. We denote
the set of mixed strategy proles as  := m1  : : :mn . Given a strategy
prole x = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 , the payo of player i under x is the sum of the
payos that he obtains in each of the bimatrix games that he plays. Formally,
we dene:
ui(x) := x
T
i
X
j2N(i)
Aijxj : (1)
We denote by ui(x
0
i;x) the payo for player i when he plays x
0
i and the other
players play according to the strategy prole x. In some cases the rst argu-
ment will be xi   x0i which may not correspond to a valid strategy for player
i but we still apply the equation as follows:
ui(xi   x0i;x) := xTi
X
j2N(i)
Aijxj   x0Ti
X
j2N(i)
Aijxj = ui(xi;x)  ui(x0i;x):
Best responses. Let vi(x) be the vector of payos for each pure strategy of
player i when the rest of players play strategy prole x. Formally:
vi(x) =
X
j2N(i)
Aijxj :
For each vector x 2 Rm, we dene suppmax(x) to be the set of indices that
achieve the maximum of x, that is, we dene suppmax(x) = fi 2 [m] : xi 
xj ; 8j 2 [m]g. Then the pure best responses of player i against a strategy
prole x (where only x i is relevant) is given by:
Bri(x) = suppmax
0@ X
j2N(i)
Aijxj
1A = suppmax(vi(x)): (2)
The corresponding best response payo is given by:
ui (x) = max
k
8<:  X
j2N(i)
Aijxj

k
9=; = maxk  vi(x)k	 : (3)
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Equilibria. In order to dene the exact and approximate equilibria of a poly-
matrix game, we rst dene the regret that is suered by each player under a
given strategy prole. The regret function fi :  ! [0; 1] is dened, for each
player i, as follows:
fi(x) := u

i (x)  ui(x): (4)
The maximum regret under a strategy prole x is given by the function f(x)
where:
f(x) := maxff1(x); : : : ; fn(x)g: (5)
We say that x is an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-NE) if we have:
f(x)  ;
and x is an exact Nash equilibrium if we have f(x) = 0.
3 The gradient
Our goal is to apply gradient descent to the regret function f . In this section,
we formally dene the gradient of f in Denition 1, and give a combinatorial
version of that denition in Lemma 3. In order to show that our gradient de-
scent method terminates after a polynomial number of iterations, we actually
need to use a slightly modied version, which we describe at the end of this
section in Denition 5.
Given a point x 2 , a feasible direction from x is dened by any other
point x0 2 . This denes a line between x and x0, and formally speaking, the
direction of this line is x0 x. In order to dene the gradient of this direction,
we consider the function f((1  )  x+   x0)  f(x) where  lies in the range
0    1. The gradient of this direction is given in the following denition.
Denition 1 Given proles x;x0 2  and  2 [0; 1], we dene:
Df(x;x0; ) := f((1  )  x+   x0)  f(x):
Then, we dene the gradient of f at x in the direction x0   x as:
Df(x;x0) = lim
!0
1

Df(x;x0; ): (6)
The gradient of f at any point x 2  along a feasible direction specied by
another point x0 2  provides the rate of decrease, or increase, of the value
of f along that direction. At any point x we wish to nd the direction such
that f decreases with the highest rate, that is, we want to nd the point x0
that minimizes Df(x;x0), and move along the direction x0   x, or to nd
that x is a stationary point, i.e. Df(x;x0)  0 for all x0 2 . Unfortunately,
Equation (6) cannot be used directly in an algorithm. Instead, in Denition 3
we provide a combinatorial version of the gradient that allows us to compute
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the steepest descent direction, with respect to the combinatorial gradient, via
a linear program.
The intuition for the combinatorial version comes from Equation (6). Let
us dene x := (1 )x+x0. From the natural gradient dened in Denition 1,
we get that:
Df(x;x0) = lim
!0
1

 
f(x)  f(x)
= lim
!0
1


max
i2[n]
fi(x)  f(x)

= max
i2[n]

lim
!0
1

 
fi(x)  f(x)

: (7)
In Appendix A we study the limit lim!0 1
 
fi(x)   f(x)

, and we prove
that it is equal to the following combinatorial version. Before we state the result
we introduce some useful notation. Given proles x and x0 let us denote:
Dfi(x;x
0) = max
k2Bri(x)
 
vi(x
0)

k
	  ui(xi;x0) + ui(xi   x0i;x): (8)
The above expression arises from expanding fi(x) f(x). The terms above are
all multiplied by  in the expansion, whereas the remaining terms all tend to
zero when the limit is taken. The following lemma is proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 Let x be strategy prole and i 2 [n]. If fi(x) = f(x), then:
lim
!0
1

 
fi(x)  f(x)

= Dfi(x;x
0)  f(x):
otherwise lim!0 1
 
fi(x)  f(x)

=  1.
Combining Equation (7) with Lemma 2 gives the following combinatorial
version of the gradient that we will use throughout the rest of the paper.
Denition 3 (Combinatorial gradient) The gradient of f at point x along
direction x0   x is:
Df(x;x0) = max
i2[n]
Dfi(x;x
0)  f(x):
In order to show that our gradient descent algorithm terminates after a
polynomial number of steps, we have to use a slight modication of the for-
mula given in Denition 3. More precisely, in Dfi(x;x
0), we need to take the
maximum over the -best responses, rather than the best responses.
We begin by providing the denition of the -best responses.
Denition 4 (-best response) Let x 2 , and let  2 (0; 0:5]. The -best
response set Bri (x) for player i 2 [n] is dened as:
Bri (x) :=
n
j 2 [mi] :
 
vi(x)

j
 ui (x)  
o
:
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We now dene the function Dfi (x;x
0).
Denition 5 Let x;x0 2 , let  2 [0; 1], and let  2 (0; 0:5]. We dene
Dfi (x;x
0) as:
Dfi (x;x
0) := max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x
0)

k
	  ui(xi;x0)  ui(x0i;x) + ui(xi;x): (9)
Furthermore, we dene Df(x;x0) as:
Df(x;x0) = max
i2[n]
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x): (10)
Our algorithm works by performing gradient descent using the function
Df as the gradient. Obviously, this is a dierent function to Df , and so
we are not actually performing gradient descent on the gradient of f . It is
important to note that all of our proofs are in terms of Df, and so this does
not aect the correctness of our algorithm. We proved Lemma 2 in order to
explain where our denition of the combinatorial gradient comes from, but the
correctness of our algorithm does not depend on the correctness of Lemma 2.
4 The algorithm
In this section, we describe our algorithm for nding a (0:5 + )-Nash equi-
librium in a polymatrix game by gradient descent. In each iteration of the
algorithm, we must nd the direction of steepest descent with respect to Df.
We show that this task can be achieved by solving a linear program, and we
then use this LP to formally specify our algorithm.
The direction of steepest descent. We show that the direction of steepest
descent can be found by solving a linear program. Our goal is, for a given
strategy prole x, to nd another strategy prole x0 so as to minimize the
gradient Df(x;x0). Recall that Df is dened in Equation (10) to be:
Df(x;x0) = max
i2[n]
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x):
Note that the term f(x) is a constant in this expression, because it is the same
for all directions x0. Thus, it is sucient to formulate a linear program in order
to nd the x0 that minimizes maxi2[n]Dfi (x;x
0). Using the denition of Dfi
in Equation (9), we can do this as follows.
Denition 6 (Steepest descent linear program) Given a strategy prole
x, the steepest descent linear program is dened as follows. Find x0 2 ,
l1; l2; : : : ; ln, and w such that:
minimize w
subject to
 
vi(x
0)

k
 li 8k 2 Bri (x); 8i 2 [n]
li   ui(xi;x0)  ui(x0i;x) + ui(x)  w 8i 2 [n]
x0 2 :
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The li variables deal with the maximum in the term maxk2Bri (x)
 
vi(x
0)

k
	
,
while the variable w is used to deal with the maximum over the functions
Dfi . Since the constraints of the linear program correspond precisely to the
denition ofDf, it is clear that, when we minimize w, the resulting x0 species
the direction of steepest descent. For each prole x, we dene Q(x) to be the
direction x0 found by the steepest descent LP for x.
Once we have found the direction of steepest descent, we then need to move
in that direction. More precisely, we x a parameter  = +2 which is used
to determine how far we move in the steepest descent direction. We derive
this value for  in Lemma 24 in Appendix B. The choice of this value for 
ensures that in every iteration of our algorithm the value of f is decreasing
and moreover, as we will show in Section 6, leads to a polynomial bound on
the running time of our algorithm.
The algorithm. We can now formally describe our algorithm. The algorithm
takes a parameter  2 (0; 0:5], which will be used as a tradeo between running
time and the quality of approximation.
Algorithm 1
1. Choose an arbitrary strategy prole x 2 .
2. Solve the steepest descent linear program with input x to ob-
tain x0 = Q(x).
3. Set x := x+ (x0   x), where  = +2 .
4. If f(x)  0:5 +  then stop, otherwise go to step 2.
A single iteration of this algorithm corresponds to executing steps 2, 3, and
4. Since this only involves solving a single linear program, it is clear that each
iteration can be completed in polynomial time.
The rest of this paper is dedicated to showing the following theorem, which
is our main result.
Theorem 7 Algorithm 1 nds a (0:5+ )-NE after at most O( 12 ) iterations.
To prove Theorem 7, we will show two properties. Firstly, in Section 5, we
show that our gradient descent algorithm never gets stuck in a stationary point
before it nds a (0:5+ )-NE. To do so, we dene the notion of a -stationary
point, and we show that every -stationary point is at least a (0:5 + )-NE,
which then directly implies that the gradient descent algorithm will not get
stuck before it nds a (0:5 + )-NE.
Secondly, in Section 6, we prove the upper bound on the number of iter-
ations. To do this we show that, if an iteration of the algorithm starts at a
point that is not a -stationary point, then that iteration will make a large
enough amount of progress. This then allows us to show that the algorithm
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will nd a (0:5+ )-NE after O( 12 ) many iterations, and therefore the overall
running time of the algorithm is polynomial.
5 Stationary points
Recall that Denition 6 gives a linear program for nding the direction x0 that
minimises Df(x;x0). Our steepest descent procedure is able to make progress
whenever this gradient is negative, and so a stationary point is any point x for
which Df(x;x0)  0. In fact, our analysis requires us to consider -stationary
points, which we now dene.
Denition 8 (-stationary point) Let x be a mixed strategy prole, and
let  > 0. We have that x is a -stationary point if for all x0 2 :
Df(x;x0)   :
We now show that every -stationary point of f(x) is a (0:5+)-NE. Recall
from Denition 5 that:
Df(x;x0) = max
i2[n]
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x):
Therefore, if x is a -stationary point, we must have, for every direction x0:
f(x)  max
i2[n]
Dfi (x
;x0) + : (11)
Since f(x) is the maximum regret under the strategy prole x, in order to
show that x is a (0:5 + )-NE, we only have to nd some direction x0 such
that maxi2[n]Dfi (x
;x0)  0:5. We do this in the following lemma.
Lemma 9 For every point x, there exists a direction x0 such that:
max
i2[n]
Dfi (x;x
0)  0:5:
Proof First, dene x to be a strategy prole in which each player i 2 [n] plays
a best response against x. We will set x0 = x+x2 . Then for each i 2 [n], we
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have that Dfi (x;x
0), is less than or equal to:
max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(
x+ x
2
)

k

  ui(xi; x+ x
2
)  ui( xi + xi
2
;x) + ui(xi;x)
=
1
2
 max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x+ x)

k
	  1
2
 ui(xi; x)  1
2
 ui( xi;x)
 1
2

 
max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x)

k
	
+ max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x)

k
	  ui(xi; x)  ui( xi;x)!
=
1
2

 
max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x)

k
	  ui(xi; x)! because xi is a b.r. to x
 1
2
 max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x)

k
	
 1
2
:
Thus, the point x0 satises maxi2[n]Dfi (x;x
0)  0:5. ut
We can sum up the results of the section in the following lemma.
Lemma 10 Every -stationary point x is a (0:5 + )-Nash equilibrium.
6 The time complexity of the algorithm
In this section, we show that Algorithm 1 terminates after a polynomial num-
ber of iterations. Let x be a strategy prole that is considered by Algorithm
1, and let x0 = Q(x) be the solution of the steepest descent LP for x. These
two proles will be xed throughout this section.
We begin by proving a technical lemma that will be crucial for showing
our bound on the number of iterations. To simplify our notation, throughout
this section we dene fnew := f(x + (x
0   x)) and f := f(x). Furthermore,
we dene D = maxi2[n]Dfi (x;x0). The following lemma, which is proved in
Appendix B, gives a relationship between f and fnew.
Lemma 11 In every iteration of Algorithm 1 we have:
fnew   f  (D   f) + 2(1 D): (12)
In the next lemma we prove that, if we are not in a -stationary point,
then we have a bound on the amount of progress made in each iteration. We
use this in order to bound the number of iterations needed before we reach a
point x where f(x)  0:5 + .
Lemma 12 Fix  = +2 , where 0 <   0:5. Either x is a -stationary point
or:
fnew 
 
1 


 + 2
2!
f: (13)
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Proof Recall that by Lemma 11 the gain in every iteration of the steepest
descent is:
fnew   f  (D   f) + 2(1 D): (14)
We consider the following two cases:
a) D   f >  . Then, by denition, we are in a -stationary point.
b) D   f   . We have set  = +2 . If we solve for  we get that  = 21  .
Since D   f   , we have that (D   f)(1  )   2. Thus we have:
(D   f)(  1)  2
0  (D   f)(1  ) + 2
0  (D   f) + (2 D + f)
 f     (D   f) + (1 D) (  0)
 2f   2  (D   f) + 2(1 D):
Thus, since 2  0 we get:
 2f  (D   f) + 2(1 D)
 fnew   f According to (14).
Thus we have shown that:
fnew   f   2f
fnew (1  2)f:
Finally, using the fact that  = +2 , we get that
fnew 
 
1 


 + 2
2!
f:
ut
So, when the algorithm has not reached yet a -stationary point, there is a
decrease on the value of f that is at least as large as the bound specied
in (13) in every iteration of the gradient descent procedure. In the following
lemma we prove that after O( 12 ) iterations of the steepest descent procedure
the algorithm nds a point x where f(x)  0:5 + .
Lemma 13 After O( 12 ) iterations of the steepest descent procedure the algo-
rithm nds a point x where f(x)  0:5 + .
Proof Let x1, x2, : : : , xk be the sequence of strategy proles that are con-
sidered by Algorithm 1. Since the algorithm terminates as soon as it nds a
(0:5+)-NE, we have f(xi) > 0:5+ for every i < k. Therefore, for each i < k
we we can apply Lemma 10 to argue that xi is not a -stationary point, which
then allows us to apply Lemma 12 to obtain:
f(xi+1) 
 
1 


 + 2
2!
f(xi):
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So, the amount of progress made by the algorithm in iteration i is:
f(xi)  f(xi+1)  f(xi) 
 
1 


 + 2
2!
f(xi)
=


 + 2
2
f(xi)



 + 2
2
 0:5:
Thus, each iteration of the algorithm decreases the regret by at least ( +2 )
2 
0:5. The algorithm starts at a point x1 with f(x1)  1, and terminates when
it reaches a point xk with f(xk)  0:5 + . Thus the total amount of progress
made over all iterations of the algorithm can be at most 1 (0:5+). Therefore,
the number of iterations used by the algorithm can be at most:
1  (0:5 + )

+2
2
 0:5
 1  0:5

+2
2
 0:5
=
( + 2)2
2
=
2
2
+
4
2
+
4
2
:
Since  < 1, we have that the algorithm terminates after at most O( 12 ) itera-
tions. ut
Lemma 13 implies that that after polynomially many iterations the algorithm
nds a point such that f(x)  0:5 + , and by denition such a point is a
(0:5 + )-NE. Thus we have completed the proof of Theorem 7.
7 Application: Two-player Bayesian games
In this section, we dene two-player Bayesian games, and show how our al-
gorithm can be applied in order to eciently nd a (0:5 + )-Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. A two-player Bayesian game is played between a row player and
a column player. Each player has a set of possible types, and at the start of the
game, each player is assigned a type by drawing from a known joint probabil-
ity distribution. Each player learns his type, but not the type of his opponent.
Our task is to nd an approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
We show that this can be reduced to the problem of nding an -NE in
a polymatrix game, and therefore our algorithm can be used to eciently
nd a (0:5 + )-BNE of a two-player Bayesian game. This section is split into
two parts. In the rst part we formally dene two-player Bayesian games,
and approximate Bayesian Nash equilibria. In the second part, we give the
reduction from two-player Bayesian games to polymatrix games.
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7.1 Denitions
Payo matrices. We will use k1 to denote the number of pure strategies of
the row player and k2 to denote the number of pure strategies of the column
player. Furthermore, we will use m to denote the number of types of the row
player, and n to denote the number of types of the column player.
For each pair of types i 2 [m] and j 2 [n], there is a k1k2 bimatrix game
(R;C)ij := (Rij ; Cij) that is played when the row player has type i and the
column player has type j. We assume that all payos in every matrix Rij and
every matrix Cij lie in the range [0; 1].
Types. The distribution over types is specied by a joint probability distri-
bution: for each pair of types i 2 [m] and j 2 [n], the probability that the row
player is assigned type i and the column player is assigned type j is given by
pij . Obviously, we have that:
mX
i=1
nX
j=1
pij = 1:
We also dene some useful shorthands: for all i 2 [m] we denote by pRi (pCj )
the probability that row (column) player has type i 2 [m] (j 2 [n]). Formally:
pRi =
nX
j=1
pij for all i 2 [m];
pCj =
mX
i=1
pij for all j 2 [n]:
Note that
Pm
i=1 p
R
i =
Pn
j=1 p
C
j = 1. Furthermore, we denote by p
R
i (j) the
conditional probability that type j 2 [n] will be chosen for column player
given that type i is chosen for row player. Similarly, we dene pCj (i) for the
column player. Formally:
pRi (j) =
pij
pRi
for all i 2 [m];
pCj (i) =
pij
pCj
for all j 2 [n]:
We can see that for given type t = (i; j) we have that pij = p
R
i  pRi (j) =
pCj  pCj (i).
Strategies. In order to play a Bayesian game, each player must specify a
strategy for each of their types. Thus, a strategy prole is a pair (x;y), where
x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xm) such that each xi 2 k1 , and where y = (y1; y2; : : : ; yn)
such that each yi 2 k2 . This means that, when the row player gets type
i 2 [m] and the column player gets type j 2 [n], then the game (Rij ; Cij) will
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be played, and the row player will use strategy xi while the column player will
use strategy yj .
Given a strategy prole (x;y), we can dene the expected payo to both
players (recall that the players are not told their opponent's type).
Denition 14 (Expected payo) Given a strategy prole (x;y) and a type
t = (i; j), the expected payo for the row player is given by:
uR(xi;y) =
nX
j=1
pRi (j)  xTi Rijyj ;
= xTi
nX
j=1
pRi (j) Rijyj :
Similarly, for the column player the expected payo is:
uC(x; yj) = y
T
j
mX
i=1
pCj (i)  CTijxi:
Rescaling. Before we dene approximate equilibria for two-player Bayesian
games, we rst rescale the payos. Much like for polymatrix games, rescaling is
needed to ensure that an -approximate equilibrium has a consistent meaning.
Our rescaling will ensure that, for every possible pair of types, both player's
expected payo uses the entire range [0; 1].
For each type i of the row player, we use U iR to denote the maximum
expected payo for the row player when he has type i, and we use LiR to
denote the minimum expected payo for the row player when he has type i.
Formally, these are dened to be:
U iR = max
a2[k1]
nX
j=1
max
b2[k2]
 
pRi (j) Rij

a;b
;
LiR = min
a2[k1]
nX
j=1
min
b2[k2]
 
pRi (j) Rij

a;b
:
Then we apply the transformation T iR() to every element z of Rij , for all types
j of the column player, where:
T iR(z) :=
1
U iR   LiR


z   L
i
R
n

: (15)
Similarly, we transform all payo matrices for the column player using:
T jC(z) :=
1
U jC   LjC

 
z   L
j
C
m
!
; (16)
where U jC and L
j
C are dened symmetrically. Note that, after this transfor-
mation has been applied, both player's expected payos lie in the range [0; 1].
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Moreover, the full range is used: there exists a strategy for the column player
against which one of the row player's strategies has expected payo 1, and
there exists a strategy for the column player against which one of the row
player's strategies has expected payo 0. From now on we will assume that
the payo matrices have been rescaled in this way.
We can now dene approximate Bayesian Nash equilibria for a two-player
Bayesian game.
Denition 15 (Approximate Bayes Nash Equilibrium (-BNE)) Let
(x;y) be a strategy prole. The prole (x;y) is an -BNE i the following
conditions hold:
uR(xi;y)  uR(x0i;y)   for all x0i 2 k1 for all i 2 [m]; (17)
uC(x; yj)  uC(x; y0j)   for all y0j 2 k2 for all j 2 [n]: (18)
7.2 The reduction
In this section we reduce in polynomial time the problem of computing an -
BNE for a two-player Bayesian game B to the problem of computing an -NE
of a polymatrix game P(B). We describe the construction of P(B) and prove
that every -NE for P(B) maps to an -BNE of B.
Construction. Let B be a two-player Bayesian game where the row player
has m types and k1 pure strategies and the column player has n types and k2
pure strategies. We will construct a polymatrix game P(B) as follows.
The game has m+ n players. We partition the set of players [m+ n] into
two sets: the set K = f1; 2; : : : ;mg will represent the types of the row player
in B, while the set L = fm+1;m+2; : : : ;m+ng will represent the types of the
column player in B. The underlying graph that shows the interactions between
the players is a complete bipartite graph G = (K[L;E), where every player in
K (respectively L) plays a bimatrix game with every player in L (respectively
K). The bimatrix game played between vertices vi 2 K and vj 2 L is dened
to be (Rij ; C

ij), where:
Rij := p
R
i (j) Rij ; (19)
Cij := p
C
j (i)  Cij : (20)
for all i 2 [m] and j 2 [n].
Observe that, for each player i in the K, the matrices Rij all have the
same number of rows, and for each player j 2 L, the matrices Cij all have the
same number of columns. Thus, P(B) is a valid polymatrix game. Moreover,
we clearly have that P(B) has the same size as the original game B. Note
that, since we have assumed that the Bayesian game has been rescaled, we
have that for every player in P(B) the minimum (maximum) payo achievable
under pure strategy proles is 0 (1), so no further scaling is needed in order
to apply our algorithm.
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We can now prove that every -NE of the polymatrix game is also an -
BNE of the original two-player Bayesian game, which is the main result of this
section.
Theorem 16 Every -NE of P(B) is a -BNE for B.
Proof Let z = (x1; : : : ; xm; y1; : : : ; yn) be an -NE for P(B). This means that
no player can gain more than  by unilaterally changing his strategy. We dene
the strategy prole (x;y) for B where x = (x1; : : : ; xm) and y = (y1; : : : ; yn),
and we will show that (x;y) is an -BNE for B.
Let i 2 K be a player. Since, z is an -NE of P(B), we have:
ui(xi; z)  ui(x0i; z)   for all x0i 2 k1 :
By construction, we can see that player i only interacts with the players from
L. Hence his payo can be written as:
ui(xi; z) = x
T
i
nX
j=1
Rijyj = u
R(xi;y):
and since we are in an -NE, we have:
uR(xi;y)  uR(x0i;y)   for all x0i 2 k1 : (21)
This is true for all i 2 K, thus it is true for all i 2 [m].
Similarly, every player j 2 L interacts only with players form K, thus:
uC(x; yj) = y
T
j
mX
i=1
(Cij)
Txi:
Since we are in an -NE we have:
uC(x; yj)  uC(x; y0j)   for all y0j 2 k2 , (22)
and this is true for all j 2 K, thus it is true for all j 2 [n].
Combining now the fact that Equation (21) is true for all i 2 [n] and that
Equation (22) is true for all j 2 [m], it is easy to see that the strategy prole
(x;y) is an -BNE for B. ut
Applying Algorithm 1 to P(B) thus gives us the following.
Theorem 17 A (0:5+)-Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a two-player Bayesian
game B can be found in time polynomial in the input size of B and 1=.
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8 Conclusions and open questions
We have presented a polynomial-time algorithm that nds a (0:5 + )-Nash
equilibrium of a polymatrix game for any  > 0. Recently it was shown [18]
that the performance guarantee that Tsaknakis and Spirakis proved for their
algorithm [28] is almost tight. Though we do not have examples that show
that the approximation guarantee is tight for our algorithm, we do not see an
obvious approach to prove a better guarantee. The initial choice of strategy
prole aects our algorithm, and it is conceivable that one may be able to
start the algorithm from an eciently computable prole with certain prop-
erties that allow a better approximation guarantee. One natural special case
is when there is a constant number of players, which may allow one to derive
new strategy proles from a stationary point as done by Tsaknakis and Spri-
rakis [28]. It may also be possible to develop new techniques when the number
of pure strategies available to the players is constant, or when the structure
of the graph is restricted in some way. For example, in the games arising from
two-player Bayesian games, the graph is always bipartite.
This paper has considered -Nash equilibria, which are the most well-
studied type of approximate equilibria. However, -Nash equilibria have a
drawback: since they only require that the expected payo is within  of a
pure best response, it is possible that a player could be required to place prob-
ability on a strategy that is arbitrarily far from being a best response. An
alternative, stronger, notion is an -well supported approximate Nash equilib-
rium (-WSNE). It requires that players only place probability on strategies
that have payo within  of a pure best response. Every -WSNE is an -Nash,
but the converse is not true. For bimatrix games, the best-known additive
approximation that is achievable in polynomial time gives a
 
2
3   0:0047

-
WSNE [17]. It builds on the algorithm given by Kontogiannis and Spirakis
that achieves a 23 -WSNE in polynomial time [25]. Recently a polynomial-time
algorithm with a better approximation guarantee have been given for symmet-
ric bimatrix games [9]. Note, it has been shown that there is a PTAS for nding
-WSNE of bimatrix games if and only if there is a PTAS for -Nash [11,6].
For n-player games with n > 2 there has been very little work on developing
algorithms for nding -WSNE. This is a very interesting direction, both in
general and when n > 2 is a constant.
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A Proof of Lemma 3
Before we begin with the proof, we introduce the following notation. For a player i 2 [n],
given a strategy prole x and a subset of i's pure strategies S  [mi], we use Mi(x; S) for
taking the maximum of the payos of i when the others play according to x, and player i is
restricted to pick elements from S:
Mi(x; S) := max
k2S
 
vi(x)

k
:
In order to nd the gradient, we have to calculate the variation of fi along the direction
x0   x, by evaluating f(x) for points x of the form
x := x+ (x0   x) = (1  )  x+   x0:
Recall from (4), that for x 2  we have that fi(x) := ui (x)   ui(x). In order to rewrite
ui (x) we introduce notation i(x;x
0; ) as follows.
Denition 18 Given (x;x0; ) and S = Bri(x) we dene i(x;x0; ) as:
i(x;x
0; ) := max

0;max
k2 S
f(vi(x))kg  max
l2S
f(vi(x))lg

: (23)
In the following technical lemma we provide an expression for ui (x). In order to rewrite
ui (x), we use the following simple observation. Consider a multiset of numbers fa1; : : : ; ang,
and the index sets S  [n] and S = [n] n S. We have the following identity:
maxfa1; : : : ; ang  max
j2S
fajg+max

0; max
k2 S
fakg  max
j2S
fajg

: (24)
In the following lemma, we use this identity with S = Bri(x) to rewrite u

i (x). We use this
particular expression for ui ( x)) because it helps us to compute the limit when  tends to
zero. Moreover, the values i(x;x
0; ) will be used in order to derive the value of  that it
is used in our algorithm.
Lemma 19 Given proles x and x0 in  and a player i 2 [n], let S = Bri(x). We have:
ui ((1  )  x+   x0)) = (1  ) Mi(x; S) +  Mi(x0; S) + i(x;x0; ): (25)
Proof
ui (x) = u

i ((1  )  x+   x0))
= max
k2[mi]
 
vi(x+ (x
0   x))
k
	
By (3)
= max
k2S
 
vi(x+ (x
0   x))
k
	
+ i(x;x
0; ) By (24) and (23)
= max
k2S
 
(1  )  vi(x) +   vi(x0)

k
	
+ i(x;x
0; ):
Since S = Bri(x), we know that for all k 2 S we have that (vi(x))k are equal, so we have
the following:
max
k2S
 
(1  )  vi(x) +   vi(x0)

k
	
= max
k2S
 
(1  )  vi(x)

k
	
+max
k2S
 
  vi(x0)

k
	
= (1  ) Mi(x; S) +  Mi(x0; S);
and we get the claimed result. ut
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We will use the expression (25) for ui (x), along with the following reformulation of
ui(x):
ui(x) = ui(x+ (x
0   x))
= ui(xi + (x
0
i   xi);x+ (x0   x))
= ui(xi;x) +   ui(xi;x0   x) +   ui(x0i   xi;x) + 2  ui(x0i   xi;x0   x)
= ui(x) +   ui(xi;x0)    ui(xi;x) +   ui(x0i;x) +   ui(xi;x)  2  ui(x0   x)
= (1  )  ui(x) + 
 
ui(xi;x
0) + ui(x0i;x)  ui(x)

+ 2  ui(x0   x): (26)
We now use these reformulations to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 20 We have that fi(x)  f(x) is equal to:

 
Dfi(x;x
0)  f(x)+ i(x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x)  (1  ) max
j2[n]

fj(x)  fi(x)
	
:
Proof Recall that S = Bri(x). For a given i 2 [n], using Lemma 19 and the reformulation
for ui(x), we have:
fi(x)  f(x) = ui (x)  ui(x)  f(x)
= (1  ) Mi(x; S) +  Mi(x0; S) + i(x;x0; )
  (1  )ui(x) + 
  ui(xi;x0)  ui(x0i;x) + ui(x)  2ui(x0   x)  f(x):
Recall from (4) that fi(x) =Mi(x; S)  ui(x), so the formula above is equal to:

 
Mi(x
0; S) ui(xi;x0) ui(x0i;x)+ui(x)

+i(x;x
0; )  2ui(x0 x)+(1  )fi(x) f(x):
Now we can use (8) for Dfi(x;x
0) so that the above formula becomes:
 Dfi(x;x0) + i(x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x) + (1  )fi(x)  f(x) =
 Dfi(x;x0) + i(x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x) + (1  )fi(x)  (1  )f(x)  f(x) =

 
Dfi(x;x
0)  f(x)+ i(x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x)  (1  ) f(x)  fi(x):
Recall now that f(x) = maxj2[n] fj(x). Thus the term f(x)   fi(x) can be written as
maxj2[n]

fj(x)  fi(x)
	
. So, the expression above is equivalent to:

 
Dfi(x;x
0)  f(x)+ i(x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x)  (1  ) max
j2[n]

fj(x)  fi(x)
	
:
ut
We will now use Lemma 20 to study the limit lim!0(fi(x)  f(x)

for all i 2 [n]. Firstly,
we deal with (x;x0; ). It is easy to see that lim!0
 
x + (x0   x) = x. Then, when
S = Bri(x) we have that:
lim
!0

max
k2 S
f(vi(x))kg  max
l2S
f(vi(x))lg

< 0:
This is true from the denition of pure best response strategies. So, from Equation (23) for
i(x;x
0; ) it is true that lim!0 i(x;x0; ) = 0.
Furthermore, the term 2  ui(x0   x) when is divided by  equals to   ui(x0   x), thus
lim!0
 
  ui(x0   x)

= 0.
Moreover, the term:
lim
!0

 1  

 max
j2[n]

fj(x)  fi(x)
	
is either 0 when fi(x) = f(x), i.e player i has the maximum regret and maxj2[n]

fj(x)  
fi(x)
	
= 0, or  1 otherwise, because maxj2[n]

fj(x)  fi(x)
	
> 0.
To sum up, if fi(x) achieves the maximum regret at point x
0, then the limit lim!0
 
fi(x) 
f(x)

= Dfi(x;x
0)  f(x), otherwise the limit equals  1.
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games 25
B Proof of Lemma 11
Throughout this proof, x;x0; x, and  will be xed as they are dened in Section 6. In order
to prove this lemma, we must show a bound on:
f(x)  f(x) = max
i2[n]
fi(x)  f(x):
Before we start the analysis we need to redene the term i (x;x
0; ) in order to prove
an analogous version of Lemma 19 when -best responses are used.
Denition 21 We dene i (x;x
0; ) as:
i (x;x
0; ) := max
8<:0; max
k2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))kg   max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg
9=; : (27)
We now use this denition to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 22 We have:
ui ((1  )  x+   x0))  (1  ) max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x))k +  max
k2Bri (x)
(vi(x
0)

k
+ i (x;x
0; ):
(28)
Proof We have:
ui ((1  )  x+   x0)) = max
k2[mi]
 
vi((1  )  x+   x0)

k
= max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi((1  )  x+   x0)

k
+ i (x;x
0; ) Using (24)
 (1  ) max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x)

k
+  max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x
0)

k
+ i (x;x
0; ):
ut
We will use the reformulation from Equation (26) for ui(x):
ui(x) = (1  )  ui(x) + 
 
ui(xi;x
0) + ui(x0i;x)  ui(x)

+ 2  ui(x0   x): (29)
The correctness of this was proved in Appendix A. Now we use all the these reformulations
in order to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 23 We have that fi(x)  f(x) is less than or equal to:

 
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x)+ i (x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x)  (1  ) max
j2[n]
ffj   fig : (30)
Proof Recall that, by denition, we have that:
fi(x) = u

i (x)  ui(x):
Thus, we can apply Lemma 22 along with the reformulation given in Equation (29) for ui(x)
to prove that fi(x)  f(x) is less than or equal to:
(1  ) max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x))k +  max
k2Bri (x)
(vi(x
0)

k
+ i (x;x
0; )
  (1  )ui(x) + 
  ui(xi;x0)  ui(x0i;x) + ui(x)  2ui(x0   x)  f(x):
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We can now use the fact that maxk2Bri (x)
 
vi(x)

k
  ui(x) = fi(x) and the denition of
Dfi (x;x
0) given in (9) to prove that the expression above is equivalent to:
 Dfi (x;x0) + i (x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x) + (1  )fi(x)  f(x)
=  Dfi (x;x0) + i (x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x) + (1  )fi(x)  (1  )f(x)  f(x)
= 
 
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x)+ i (x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x)  (1  ) f(x)  fi(x)
= 
 
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x)+ i (x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x)  (1  ) max
j2[n]

fj(x)  fi(x)
	
:
This completes the proof. ut
Having shown Lemma 23, we will now study each term of (30) and provide bounds for
each of them. To begin with, it is easy to see that for all i 2 [n] we have that maxj2[n]

fj(x) 
fi(x)
	  0, and since  < 1, we have that (1   )maxj2[n]fj(x)   fi(x)	  0. Thus,
Equation (30) is less than or equal to:

 
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x)+ i (x;x0; )  2ui(x0   x): (31)
Next we consider the term i (x;x
0; ). In the following technical lemma we prove that
i (x;x
0; ) = 0 for all i 2 [n].
Lemma 24 We have i (x;x
0; ) = 0 for all i 2 [n].
Proof According to equation (27) for i (x;x
0; ), we have:
i (x;x
0; ) = max
8<:0; max
k2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))kg   max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg
9=; :
We can rewrite this expression as follows. First dene:
Z(x;x0; ; k) = (vi(x))k   max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg:
Then we have:
i (x;x
0; ) = max

0; max
k2Bri (x)
n
Z(x;x0; ; k)
o
:
Our goal is to show that, for our chosen value of , we have i (x;x
0; ) = 0. For this to be
the case, we must have that Z(x;x0; ; k)  0 for all k 2 Bri (x). In the rest of this proof,
we will show that this is indeed the case.
By denition, we have that:
(vi(x))k =
 
vi(x) + (vi(x
0)  vi(x))

k
: (32)
The term maxl2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg can be written as follows:
max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi((1  )x+ x0))lg  max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi((1  )x))lg
= (1  )  max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg
= max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg     max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg: (33)
We now substitute these two bounds into the denition of Z(x;x0; ; k). We have:
Z(x;x0; ; k)  vi(x)k  max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg+ 

vi(x
0)k vi(x)k+ max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg

:
(34)
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From the denition of -best responses (Denition 4), we know that for all k 2 Bri (x):
vi(x)k   max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg <  :
Furthermore, since we know that the maximum payo for player i 2 [n] is 1, we have the
following trivial bound for all k 2 Bri (x):
vi(x
0)k   vi(x)k + max
l2Bri (x)
f(vi(x))lg  2:
Substituting these two bounds into Equation (34) gives, for all k 2 Bri (x):
Z(x;x0; ; k)    +   2:
Thus, for each k 2 Bri (x), we have that Z(x;x0; ; k)  0 whenever:
  +   2  0;
and this is equivalent to:
  
2
:
This inequality holds by the denition of , so we have Z(x;x0; ; k)  0 for all k 2 Bri (x),
which then implies that i (x;x
0; )  0. ut
Next we consider the term ui(x
0   x) in Equation (31). The following lemma provides
a simple lower bound for this term.
Lemma 25 For all i 2 [n], we have Dfi (x;x0)  1  ui(x0   x).
Proof For ui(x
0   x) we have the following:
ui(x
0   x) = ui(x0i   xi;x0   x)
= ui(x
0
i;x
0   x)  ui(xi;x0   x)
= ui(x
0
i;x
0)  ui(x0i;x)  ui(xi;x0) + ui(xi;x): (35)
Recall from (9) that:
Dfi (x;x
0) = max
k2Bri (x)
 
vi(x
0)

k
	  ui(xi;x0)  ui(x0i;x) + ui(xi;x):
We can see that (35) and (9) dier only in terms ui(x
0
i;x
0) and maxk2Bri (x)
 
vi(x
0)

k
	
re-
spectively. We know that maxk2Bri (x)
 
vi(x
0)

k
	  1. Then, we can see that Dfi (x;x0) 
1  ui(x0   x). ut
Recall that D = maxi2[n]Dfi (x;x0) and fnew = f(x) and f = f(x). We can now apply
the bounds from Lemma 24 and Lemma 25 to Equation (31) to obtain:
fnew   f  max
i2[n]
n

 
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x)  2 Dfi (x;x0)  1o
 max
i2[n]
n

 
Dfi (x;x
0)  f(x)  2 D   1o
= (D   f) + 2(1 D):
This completes the proof of Lemma 11.
